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Extending Non-Exclusive Parenting
and the Right to Protection





While parents have a right to raise their children free
from state intervention, children have a countervailing
right to protection from abuse and neglect. If the allegations
of abuse and neglect are severe enough, federal and state
laws' aimed at protecting children require that they be
removed from their parents and placed in foster care.
Foster care is an entitlement, and every state is required by
state and federal law to provide foster care for eligible
children.2  Foster care provides out-of-home care for
approximately 500,000 children in the U.S. every day.! Most
of these children are in foster care as a result of allegations
of abuse and neglect against their parents.4
At the age of eighteen or twenty-one, the right to
protection is superceded by a right of empowerment as
children mature out of the system whether they are ready
for independence or not.5 Foster care ends when children
t Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo School
of Law. The author wishes to thank Sheila Dickinson, Kimberly Gensler, Jana
Kosberg and David Zamiello for their excellent research assistance.
1. See infra Part II.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 622 (1994).
3. STAFF OF H.R. COmnTTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105TH CONG., 1998 GREEN
Boom BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 783 (Comm. Print 1998). Statistics in
the 1998 Green Book, the most recent available, are for 1995 and previously.
4. See id. at 790.
5. See Gerald P. Mallon, After Care, Then Where? Outcomes of an
Independent Living Program, 77 CHILD WELFARF 61, 62 (1998) (stating at the
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reach the age of majority, eighteen or twenty-one,
depending on state law and regulations.' In 1999, Congress
estimated that 20,000 teens exited foster care because they
"aged-out" of the system, reaching the age at which
eligibility for foster care benefits is terminated.
The right to protection frames the entire child welfare
system and much of the state laws governing the state
systems, but it is not clearly recognized under
constitutional law.8 The right is strongest at the front end of
the foster care system after cases are investigated and
initial placements are developed. In making early
placement decisions, non-exclusive parenting' is the
framework in the allocation of parental rights. Parental
rights are shared by a child's biological parents, the state as
parens patriae and the foster parents who provide day-to-
day care for the child under contract with a public or
private agency. The more cooperative the arrangement,
using kinship care or foster parents willing to assist the
biological parents to regain custody, the more ideal the
outset, "Preparing young people in out-of-home care for independent living and
for successful adulthood has not been one of the child welfare system's primary
goals.").
6. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 13.34.030 (1) (2000) (stating that a child is
"any individual under the age of eighteen years."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 346-17.4
(a) (1) (1999) (stating that a child is eligible for foster care if "[tihe person is
twenty-one years or younger.").
7. H.R. 3443, 106th Cong., 1999. As a result of the Foster Care
Independence Act, discussed infra Part III, states may now continue some
benefits to age 21 and receive federal reimbursement for those foster care
benefits.
8. See Deshaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189
(1982) (discussed infra Part I, deciding that the state does not owe a duty to
protect a child from violence at least until the child is in state custody).
9. The notion of alternatives to exclusive parenting for stepchildren,
children of unwed fathers, and foster children was introduced and developed by
Katherine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70
VA. L. REV. 879 (1984). More recently it has been declared that "the notion of
exclusivity is alive and well as one of the pillars of the traditional nuclear
family." Alison Harvison Young, Reconceiving the Family: Challenging the
Paradigm of the Exclusive Family, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 505, 506 (1998).
The work of Martha Fineman emphasizing family function over family form and
state support for familial functions highlights the importance of recognizing and
reimbursing responsible adults who fulfill caretaking roles. See MARTHA
FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH
CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995); Martha Albertson Fineman, What Place for Family
Privacy?, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1207 (1999).
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placement.
At the back end of the system, children exit foster care
when they age out of the foster care system or are
discharged from state care. The first option upon exit from
foster care is to again make parental rights exclusive. This
first option is accomplished by recreating exclusive
parenting through reunification of children with their
parents or adoption," but ongoing shared parenting is not a
goal. A second option, a fall-back, is to discharge the child to
independent living with no parental support. The second
option results in children who leave foster care solely
because of age. They age out of the system despite the fact
that no familial resources are identified for them.
This article challenges two aspects of the foster care
system: the shift of rights from protection to empowerment
and the construction of parenting arrangements from non-
exclusive to exclusive as children move out of foster care. It
raises the possibility and argues for the desirability of a
third option-a right to protection which is ongoing" and
non-exclusive parenting as a viable framework upon
discharge from care. 2 The third option is necessary to
10. With the passage of the Adoption and Safe Families Act in 1997, the
focus has arguably shifted from reunification to adoption in some cases as the
preferred goal. See Celeste Pagano, Adoption and Foster Care, 36 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 242 (1999). Debate is beginning on the propriety of this shift. See, e.g.,
Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care,
and Adoption, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1189 (1999). This article argues that either
reunification or adoption assumes exclusive parenting and that must be
challenged to allow non-exclusive parenting options in appropriate cases. But
see In re Billy Joe M. and Jason M., 521 S.E.2d 173, 177-78 (W. Va 1999)
(holding that following termination of parental rights to free children for
adoption, visitation with the biological former parents may be appropriate).
11. It is awkward to argue for an ongoing right to protection when it is
perhaps more accurate to recognize that children simply need "ongoing,
intimate, hierarchical relationships." Naomi Cahn & Jana Singer, Adoption,
Identity, and the Constitution: The Case for Opening Closed Records, 2 U. PA. J.
ON CONST. L. 150, 152 (1999). I use the language of rights to argue against the
exclusivity of the right to protection or the right to empowerment while
agreeing with Professor Cahn and others that a discussion of rights alone is
inadequate to capture the complexity of children's lives.
12. For a discussion of the "pendulum" swing between policies for
reunification or termination as the preferred goal, see Megan M. O'Laughlin, A
Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster Care May be the Key to Stopping The
Pendulum of Terminations vs. Reunification, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1427, 1429
(1998). Ms. O'Laughlin argues for kinship for several reasons, including the
likelihood that children will maintain relationships with their biological
parents. See id. at 1451. Kinship care is an important form of non-exclusive
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create permanency plans for older children aging out of
foster care that will be more supportive in helping them
make safe and successful transitions to adulthood.
This third option draws upon non-exclusive parenting
and a child's right to protection to configure parental
supports for children aging out of care who cannot benefit
from exclusive parenting by being reunified with their
families or adopted (first option) and are not ready for
successful independent living (second option). It challenges
arbitrary age deadlines, recently moved from eighteen to
twenty-one by federal law, to create child-centered adult
supports for children who would otherwise age out of foster
care with no such resources. This article is focusing on
creative permanency plans for teen children aging out of
foster care. These may not be ideal or even preferable to
traditional permanency plans, but they are suggested when
all current options are unattainable and the child would
otherwise age out due to a birthday and not because the
necessary supports are in place to successfully exit care.
Current law allows foster care past age eighteen to age
twenty-one in some cases. I am not concerned with
establishing an endpoint applicable in all cases. Instead, I
am introducing permanency options that would be available
to the child, agency and court to use as appropriate until
whatever time they are no longer agreed to or approved via
judicial or administrative mechanisms. While development
of the precise review mechanisms is beyond the scope of this
article, I am assuming reviews as are currently in place for
foster care for young adults aged eighteen to twenty-one.
In Part I, the theories of non-exclusive parenting and
the right to protection are explained and applied to foster
children, especially older children in care. I then discuss the
parent-child-state balance of rights and responsibilities for
children in foster care. I draw on the concept of "non-
exclusive parenting" to suggest a broader conception of the
custodial rights shared in the parent-child-state-triangle.
In Part II, I briefly summarize the federal law
governing the child welfare system prior to 1997. The
background on federal initiatives is provided to document
the development of the two polar options of exclusive
parenting, but it is usually arranged informally or as temporary foster care. It
is an option which the author endorses when it takes the form of guardianships
or open adoptions as discussed infra Part IV.
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parenting or full independence. Reliance on exclusive
parenting in permanency planning has resulted in limited
familial designs that do not work for all children exiting
care. The second option of independence too often merely
abandons teens without the supports necessary to succeed.
In Part III, I describe the Adoption and Safe Families
Act" and the Foster Care Independence Act 4  by
highlighting how these two pieces of legislation changed
prior law regarding permanency planning. I also discuss the
legislative histories to help unravel why changes were
deemed necessary. Information on the plight of children
who age out of foster care was documented in the legislative
histories and illuminates why these laws will not fully meet
the needs of older children in foster care. These recent
legislative changes still leave a gap of alternatives for older
teens.
In Part IV, I first recommend open adoption and
secondly guardianship as examples of non-exclusive
parenting which need to be permitted and subsidized by the
federal government and states for children in foster care.
Open adoption and guardianship can create vital familial
supports for children who would otherwise remain in foster
care and then age out with no familial supports. Thirdly, I
develop and support the concept of funded mentors for
children for whom other caretaking arrangements are not
achieved. Since closed adoption is not an alternative for
many and independent living leaves them with no custodial
figure, I suggest these three types of non-exclusive
parenting arrangements and the legal reforms necessary to
make them viable for older teens. I argue that allowing
open adoptions, subsidized guardianships and funded
mentors would create additional permanency alternatives,
vital third options, for children who would otherwise age
out of the foster care system.
PART I: NON-EXCLUSIVE PARENTING AND THE RIGHT TO
PROTECTION
"Rather than seeking to provide adults for children who
need them, [current law] seems intent on securing children
13. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)).
14. H.R. 3443, 106th Cong. (1999).
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for adults who claim them."l
A. Non-Exclusive Parenting in Permanency Planning
Private family law6 operates within a framework of
exclusive rights, usually triumphing biology over all other
considerations.' Private family law allocates the
distribution of rights between biological parents' in
situations of marital dissolution. Even in such disputes, the
goal is to develop a custody arrangement which can operate
free of state intervention and oversight. "
While third parties, such as grandparents, may seek
visitation over the wishes of a parent, especially when they
have an ongoing relationship with a child, such
infringements on parental control are limited. 9 Valuing
exclusive parenting elevates complete authority over a child
above bonding, a child's wishes and any other
considerations that may be relevant to the child-parent
relationship.
In developing a theory of non-exclusive parenting, and
mindful of the significance attached to parental rights,
concerns for parental rights versus _psychological
attachments have framed the discussion. For older
15. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child.Centered
Perspective on Parents'Rights, 14 CARDozO L. REV. 1747, 1812 (1993).
16. I refer to private family law to describe matrimonial law, domestic
relations, and the general doctrinal area governing the allocation of rights and
property within families. The state holds no custodial interest in such families.
17. ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAmILY BONDS (1993); Young, supra note 9, at
506 (discussing the notion that family structures are limited to the traditional
two-parent model and that parental rights are exclusive rights held by parents
alone).
18. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-351 (1999); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (6)
(Michie 1999).
19. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000); Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Protecting Children's Relationships with Extended Family: The
Impact of Troxel v. Granville, 19 CHILD L. PRAC. 65, 70 (2000) (examining the
plurality opinion carefully and finding that "[t]he core of the plurality opinion
was quite simple and limited: given that parents enjoy constitutional protection
of their child-rearing decisions, the state may not intervene without giving
'some special weight' to a fit parent's decision").
20. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979) (developing the concept of continuity of care and the psychological
parent); JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1979) (explaining the importance of parental autonomy and the high standards
necessary before intervention into the family can be justified); Bartlett, supra
note 9, at 883-86, 902-11, 939-44 (discussing parental rights, psychological
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children exiting foster care with no parental resource able
to care for them, this polar discussion is irrelevant. Instead
of debating exclusive versus non-exclusive parenting, the
attention needs to be on implementing and supporting non-
exclusive relationships, at least when other more
traditional exclusive arrangements are not tenable.2'
In contrast, public family law operates under no such
illusions of exclusivity. I refer to public family law to
describe "cases where the state has intervened into the
'private' family to assume some custodial interest from the
parents."" The parent-child-state doctrinal framework
assumes a sharing of parental responsibilities among the
state, its agents and the parents. The sharing has been
challenged by many who argue that the non-exclusivity is
not broad enough. These critics argue that "important
others" such as grandparents, foster parents, private
provider agencies and others should have rights recognized
in relation to their responsibility toward the child. 3 These
important others have gained limited legal recognition in
sharing the rights and responsibilities of caring for
children. For older children, especially those in foster care,
the need for a broadened circle of care in the form of non-
exclusive parenting is imperative to a successful transition
to adulthood.
Non-exclusive parenting defines the foster care system'
but has not been used as a way to imagine permanent
arrangements for children to safely exit care. In the foster
care system, biological parents voluntarily or by order of the
court surrender the caretaking responsibilities of their
child. The state takes temporary custody of children, but
parental rights to visit and make certain formative
attachments and foster care as a form of non-exclusive parenting).
21. See Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized
Guardianship, Foster Care and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE
441, 463 (1996) ("Proponents of guardianship do not urge replacing adoption,
rather only using guardianship as an alternative when adoption is
inappropriate or impractical for a child.").
22. Susan Vivian Mangold, Challenging the Parent-Child-State Triangle in
Public Family Law: The Importance of Private Providers in the Dependency
System, 47 BUFF. L. REv. 1397, 1397 (1999).
23. See id. at 1455; Erica L. Strawman, Grandparent Visitation: The Best
Interests of the Grandparent, Child, and Society, 30 U. TOL. L. REv. 31 (1998).
24. For an introduction to the issues in choosing and supporting caring
relationships for foster children, see Marianne Berry, Adoption in an Era of
Family Preservation, 20 CHILD & YOUTH SERv. REV. 1 (1998).
2000] 841
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decisions remain with the parent.2 5 The state places the
child in a placement directly provided by the state or
contracts with a non-profit or for-profit private provider 21 to
place the child in a foster home. Parenting responsibilities
and rights can thereby be shared by the biological parents,
state agency, private agency, and foster parents.
For children leaving foster care before they would
otherwise age out of the system, non-exclusive parenting is
seemingly forgotten. The state looks to either return the
child to the parents, perhaps with temporary state
supervision, or to place the child for adoption. The ideal exit
from foster care, despite the reality for older children, is to
resume or develop new exclusive parental control through
reunification or adoption, free of state intervention and
assistance.
Foster care is meant as a temporary arrangement, and
the non-exclusive parenting forced by the arrangement is
also meant to be temporary. But for many children,
especially the 20,000 teens who age out of foster care
exclusive parenting relationships are never reconstituted. 7
For these children, new options must be developed to
provide needed adult resources for them as they exit foster
care.
B. Extending the Right to Protection
In her now famous and often misunderstood article on
children's rights, Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote in 1973
that the term "children's rights" was a "slogan in need of a
definition.""  Twenty-seven years later, the notion of
children's rights is still not well defined. Perhaps it is more
accurate to say that there is no singularly accepted
definition or theory of the rights held by children. The
rights claimed tend to be of two general types: those
advocating for children as autonomous persons under the
25. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW§ 431.14 (McKinney 2000).
26. For a description and analysis of subcontracting with profit and non-
profit providers in the foster care system, see Susan Vivian Mangold,
Protection, Privatization and Profit in the Foster Care System, 60 OHIO ST. L. J.
1295, 1312-13 (1999).
27. See H.R. 3443, 106th Cong. (1999).




law29 and those placing a claim on society for protection
from harms perpetrated on children because of their
dependency."0 I label the first type as the right to
empowerment and the second as the right to protection.
The rights of empowerment for children were advocated
in the manner in which many rights connected with
oppressed minorities were pressed in the 1960s. Some
children's advocates explicitly cited children as the next
group after African-Americans and women who were
entitled to a revolutionary expansion of rights.3
Empowerment rights were necessary to recognize children's
equality with adults. They would give children such
privileges of citizenry as the right to vote, work and
contract. 2 While empowerment rights may always be held
by children, they cannot be exercised until the child reaches
a certain level of maturity.33 While the age at which such an
exercise occurs may vary, the key is that the right of
empowerment evolves for each child from inability to
exercise to ability to exercise.
Unlike the rights connected with empowerment,
protection-based rights evolve in the opposite pattern. The
very young or incompetent have the strongest claim on
these rights, but the ability to exercise them diminishes
with maturity. Our foster care system has been developed
to give children a right to protection until the age of
eighteen or in some cases twenty-one. Independent living
29. See, e.g., JOHN HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974). See also HENRY H.
FOSTER, JR., A "BILL OF RIGHTS" FOR CHILDREN (1977).
30. See, e.g., Bruce C. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to their "Rights",
1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 605.
31. See Martha Minow, What Ever Happened to Children's Rights?, 80
MINN. L. REV. 267, 270 (1995) (discussing works such as John Holt's Escape
from Childhood and Richard Farson's Birthrights to explain this movement in
the 1960s and 1970s, but with origins much earlier in the writings of Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey).
32. See, e.g., RICHARD FARSON, BIRTHRIGHTS 163-65, 175 (1974).
33. See Emily Buss, Confronting Developmental Barriers to the
Empowerment of Child Clients, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 895, 913, 918 (1999)
(arguing that developmental issues are important in considering empowerment
rights of children). But see Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of
Empowerment: Rethinking the Role of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling
the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1655 (1996) (arguing that empowerment
is an important consideration for all children in determining the model of
attorney representation of children).
2000] 843
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initiatives34 for teens in foster care seek to enhance the
empowerment rights of children. Regardless of a child's
maturity and resources, and regardless of their success in
independent living programs, they are liberated from foster
care when they reach the age of majority.
Protection-based interests should not end at age
eighteen or twenty-one, and ability to exercise
empowerment rights is not complete at that time. Instead,
the need for the broadened parent-child-state triangle to
protect the child continues even as more rights and
responsibilities are vested in the maturing child.
C. Exclusive Parenting and the Parent-Child-State
Framework5 in Public Family Law
Constitutional caselaw has fortified the notion of
exclusive parenting. The holdings lead to the doctrinal
conclusion that even when the state does intervene to
protect children, it is in a power sharing role with parents.
Other caretakers do not share in the exclusive parent-child-
state balance of rights and responsibilities. In the first half
of the twentieth century, three Supreme Court cases dealt
with the rights of parents or legal guardians to exercise
exclusive authority and control over the upbringing of their
children in the face of state laws limiting that authority.36
These cases have long been considered key to
understanding state intervention into the "private" family;
they establish a tripartite balance of rights and
responsibilities among the exclusive parents, the child, and
the state. By ignoring the role of all other caretaking actors
except parents, the norm of exclusive parenting is accepted
and solidified. Absent acceptable state intervention to
protect children, parents' exclusive control over their
children is protected.
In Meyer v. Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
state laws infringing upon the authority of parents were
deemed unconstitutional. The Pierce Court recognized the
34. Independent Living Initiatives, Pub. L. No. 99-272, Title xii, § 12307 (a),
100 Stat. 294 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 677 (1997)).
35. For a fuller discussion of the seminal Supreme Court cases establishing
the parent-child-state framework, see Mangold, supra note 22, at 1402-10
(summarized in part in this section).
36. See Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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exclusive rights of parents and their vital duty to their
children and the state.
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain
that the Act of 1922 [mandating that children attend public
schools] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control .... The child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high4 duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.
This oft-quoted phrase recognizes an exchange of rights
and duties between exclusive parents and the state on
behalf of children. The parent-child-state triangular
balance is introduced constitutionally. This doctrinal
framework is accepted as the constitutional contribution of
the Court in Pierce, but it ignores the importance of the
rights and duties of the provider agency, the Society of
Sisters, that were so integral to the Pierce decision. In
Pierce, the rights of parents to choose religious over secular
education were upheld in striking down a public-school-only
state law. The fact that the case was brought by a religious
organization, the Society of Sisters, to enjoin enforcement of
the law and the importance of such religious organizations
in the community is lost in the later constitutional analysis.
The Court in Prince v. Massachusetts built upon the
foundation laid by Meyer and Pierce by further articulating
the parent-child-state framework. The Prince Court held
valid a state child labor law against both the legal
guardian's assertion that the law violated her right to raise
the child as she saw fit and the child's right to practice
Jehovah Witness beliefs by selling religious magazines.38 In
discussing the applicable precedents, the Court limited the
holdings of Meyer and Pierce to an exchange of rights and
duties among parents, children and the state:
Previously, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, this Court had
sustained the parent's authority to provide religious with secular
37. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (citation omitted).
38. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (stating appellant is
caretaking aunt). The three cases building the parent-state-child framework of
rights and responsibilities are all brought by "others." See id.; see also Meyer v.
Nebraska, 268 U.S. at 391 (1923) (stating plaintiff is teacher); Pierce, 268 U.S.
at 511 (stating plaintiff is private provider agency).
2000] 845
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schooling, and the child's right to receive it, as against the state's
requirement of attendance at public schools. And in Meyer v.
Nebraska, children's rights to receive teaching in languages other
than the nation's common tongue were guarded against the
state's encroachment. It is cardinal with us that the custody, care
and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations
the state can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of
this that these decisions have respected the private realm of
family life that the state cannot enter .... It is sufficient to show
what indeed appellant hardly disputes, that the state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in
things affecting the child's welfare .... 39
The Prince Court focused on the limits of state and
parental control over children, and obscured the holding in
the earlier cases that included rights and duties of other
rights holders, namely teachers, schools, and private
providers. By defining the parent leg of the triangle as an
exclusive realm and relying on a narrow, three-party
balance of rights and responsibilities, the Prince Court
further established the parent-child-state framework for
considering liberty rights and concurrent duties."
This framework was not further developed by the
Supreme Court until the 1972 case of Wisconsin v. Yoder4'
reinforced the exclusive authority of parents. That case
resulted in a successful challenge to compulsory education
laws imposed on the Amish. In Yoder, parents had been
convicted under a Wisconsin law requiring attendance at
school until the age of sixteen. The parents argued that
sending their teens to school past the eighth grade violated
their Amish beliefs and lifestyle. The Court agreed with the
parents and relied upon the parent-child-state balance
established in Meyer, Pierce, and Prince. The Court stated
in relevant part:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education.
Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a
State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made
39. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67 (citations omitted).
40. See id.
41. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education
in a privately operated system. There the Court held that Oregon's
statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to
age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in
directing the rearing of their offspring, including their education
in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of
parental direction of the religious formative years have a high
42place in our society.
The Yoder Court quoted and relied upon Meyer, Pierce,
and Prince extensively in a decision that worked within a
balance of exclusive rights and responsibilities between
parents and the state and further developed the closed
triangular doctrinal framework.'
Indeed it seems clear that if the State is empowered, as parens
patriae, to "save" a child from himself or his Amish parents by
requiring an additional two years of compulsory formal high school
education, the State will in large measure influence, if not
determine, the religious future of the child. Even more markedly
than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the fundamental
interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide
the religious future and education of their children .... If not the
first, perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this
area are found in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Court
observed: ".Jnder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
we think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably
interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children under their control .... The
child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty,
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations ....
Meyer, Pierce, Prince, and Yoder dealt with state
intervention into parental authority but there were no
Supreme Court public family law cases dealing with state
custody of children. In Santosky v. Kramer45 and then in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
42. Id. at 213-14 (citations omitted).
43. The rights of children were not considered explicitly by the majority but
they were raised by Justice Douglas in his dissent. The framework developed
was a triangle of rights and duties on behalf of, but not owed to or by, the child.
See id. at 241 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing for a remand to consider the
wishes of the children whose parents were convicted under the law).
44. Id. at 232-33.
45. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
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Services,46 parental rights and duties and state rights and
duties toward abused and neglected children were
addressed by the Supreme Court. The parent-child-state
framework was imposed on public family law. In Santosky,
the Court held that the standard necessary to involuntarily
terminate parental rights was "clear and convincing
evidence."47 Even when children were in the dependency
system and their care was subject to procedural safeguards
at each juncture, the Court found that the importance of the
parental right to the care and control of their child could
not be severed absent a showing by the state of clear and
convincing evidence of unfitness. 8 The Santosky Court
relied on a line of cases, beginning with Meyer, Pierce, and
Prince to demonstrate historical recognition of exclusive
parental rights.
[F]reedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents
in the care, custody, and management of their child does not
evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when
blood relations are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If
anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do
those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.
49
In DeShaney,0 the exclusive control of parents was
upheld in a case whose facts were deeply challenging to the
notion of exclusive parenting. The court declined to find a
state duty to protect a child who was in the custody of his
father, not in state custody, when the child suffered
permanent serious injury at the hands of his father.5 The
Winnebago County Department of Social Services was
46. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
47. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 769.
48. See id.
49. Id. at 753 (citations omitted).
50. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
51. For a provocative discussion of the Thirteenth Amendment as the more
appropriate cause of action in this case, see Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel
Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to
DeShaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1992).
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repeatedly informed of incidents of abuse and the risk of
further abuse, but the agency did not remove the young
child from his father's care.52 The Court reasoned that the
State's right to intervene, to investigate and monitor the
situation, did not implicate a duty to protect the child who
remained in his father's care." In accordance with the
parent-child-state framework developed in the Meyer-
Pierce-Prince line, the state had not taken on the custodial
right and therefore did not hold the accompanying duty to
protect the child. The right of control had been left
exclusively to the father, and the child could not make out a
liberty claim for denial of a duty to protect based on the
father's acts of "private violence."
These Supreme Court decisions determined the
parameters of the parent-child-state relationship. Although
the interests of additional parties were present in the early
cases-the teacher and schools in Meyer, the private
provider Society of Sisters in Pierce, the caretaking aunt in
Prince-the decisions stand for a line of family law cases
which developed a framework for analyzing parent, child,
and state rights and responsibilities in the face of state
intervention. Even though additional parties were
intimately involved in the cases and in the lives of the
children affected by the challenged laws, the decisions are
accepted as precedents for a family law jurisprudence which
operates as if only parents, children, and the state were
involved in the cases or hold rights and duties in the lives of
children. In the latter cases, when the state does intervene
based on the child's right to protection from abuse and
neglect, the norm of exclusive parenting persists. The state
may intervene into the otherwise exclusive parent-child
relationship, but such intervention is structured to protect
parental rights. When state intervention in the form of
custody is necessitated, it ideally ends when the exclusive
biological parent-child relationship is resumed or when the
state terminates parental rights in favor of an exclusive
adoptive relationship.
52. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 191.
53. See id. at 197.
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PART II: PERMANENCY PLANNING AND OLDER FOSTER
CHILDREN
A. Legislatinq Intervention Based on the Right to
Protection '
The exclusive parent-child relationship can be
disturbed by allegations of abuse or neglect. All states have
in place a child protection system which responds to such
allegations by investigating families and temporarily
removing children when it is deemed necessary for their
safety.55 Sometimes children are voluntarily placed outside
the home by parents during the course of the investigation,
and sometimes a court mandates the placement.6 When
placed, these children enter a system of out-of-home care
which can include non-relative foster family homes, foster
homes provided by relatives called "kinship homes," group
homes or larger residential settings. Once placed in out-of-
home care by the child protection system through the
voluntary or involuntary temporary surrender of parents,
these children become foster children.57 Foster care is
always meant to be temporary. A permanency plan is
written for every child in care with a recognized goal (e.g.,
reunification, adoption, independent living) and a set of
action steps to achieve that goal.
Until the mid-twentieth century, private provider
54. For a fuller discussion of the progression of federal legislation to address
child abuse and neglect, see Mangold, supra note 22 (summarized in part in this
section).
55. The state child protection systems operate under federal mandates
codified in the Social Security Act since the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106 (1994 & Supp. 1997)). For a summary of the
history of child protection and of the present operation of the system, see
Mangold, supra note 22.
56. A voluntary placement agreement with the parent or legal guardian or a
court adjudication is necessary for federal reimbursement for the placement
under 42 U.S.C. § 672(a)(1) (Supp. 1998).
57. This article focuses on out-of-home care provided through the child
protection system and not as a result of delinquency, mental illness or status
offenses which result in placement outside the child welfare system. For a
discussion of foster care in the delinquency system, see Burt Galaway et al.,
Specialist Foster Family Care for Delinquent Youth, 59 FED. PROBATION 19(1995). For a discussion of privatization of care in these systems, see Mangold,
supra note 26, at 1300 & n.14.
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agencies championed interventions on behalf of abused and
neglected children. States made fledgling efforts on behalf
of individual children, but neither the civil nor the criminal
response was uniform or broadly applied. State criminal
prosecutions for abuse continued without any federal
legislative guidance into the 1970s. No federal law
challenged the exclusivity of the "private family."
A fifty-state response ultimately led the federal
government to mandate uniformity in the treatment of
abused and neglected children. A seminal event in the
history of state intervention into the exclusive, private
realm of the family to protect children from child abuse and
neglect was the 1962 publication of Battered Child
Syndrome by Dr. Henry Kempe.58 Kempe was a pediatrician
who worked with pediatricians and radiologists to identify
causes of suspicious injuries to children.59 With new
knowledge about injuries that could only be caused by
abusive behavior, states moved to codify responses to
protect children. Between 1963 and 1967, every state passed
a statute requiring some form of reporting of incidents of
child abuse. Such reporting is the initial trigger for state
intervention into the exclusive parent-child relationship.
Reporting triggers the state response based on a child's
right to protection from abuse and neglect.
In 1973, the Senate Subcommittee on Children and
Youth of the Committee on Labor and Public Weliare held
hearings in Washington and at children's hospitals around
the country on the needs of abused and neglected children."
Bills were introduced in both the House and Senate, but the
Senate subcommittee chaired by Walter Mondale held the
main hearings. In a letter of transmittal to the Senate
Committee Chairman, Mondale explained the need for
legislation:
The Subcommittee held hearings in Washington, New York,
Denver and Los Angeles. Members of the Subcommittee personally
visited victims of child abuse in hospitals and observed firsthand
58. See C. Henry Kempe et al., The Battered-Child Syndrome, 181 JAMA 1(1962).
59. See C. Henry Kempe, Pediatric Implications of the Battered Baby
Syndrome, 46 ARCHIVES OF DISEASE IN CHILDHOOD 28 (1971).
60. See Child Abuse Prevention Act, 1973: Hearings on S. 1191 Before the
Subcomm. on Children and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 93d Cong. 2 (1973) [hereinafter Mondale Hearings].
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the operations of multidisciplinary child abuse teams in several
cities. We were appalled to learn how many abused and neglected
children there are and how little is being done to help them and
their troubled families. Statistics vary widely, but there is little
question that thousands and thousands of youngsters suffer severe
physical and emotional abuse every year. This is a problem that
cuts across social and economic barriers. It occurs in all kinds of
families and in all kinds of neighborhoods. Yet there was no
focused Federal effort to deal with the problem. Nowhere in the
Federal government could we find one official assigned full time to
the prevention, identification and treatment of child abuse and
neglect.
61
One year later in 1974, the Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act (CAPTA) was passed." CAPTA initiated a
federal response to child abuse based on a child's right to
protection by the state where there is evidence of parental
harm. It formulated the mandates for the development of a
bureaucracy within the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare (HEW) (now called the Department of Health
and Human Services) to gather information and expertise
on the problem of child abuse, a largely undocumented
subject at the time." It also provided funding through HEW
for state demonstration projects that were broadly defined
in terms of federal directives for their operation.6 Most
important for the subsequent history of the federal/state
relationship addressing child abuse, CAPTA contained
provisions for a grant program." Unlike the demonstration
projects, eligibility for grants required states to follow a
series of mandates in order to receive the funds. Those
provisions concerned reporting, investigating,
confidentiality of record keeping, and law enforcement
cooperation." They were the earliest version of the more
61. Id. at 2 Getter from Walter Mondale to Hon. Harrison A. Williams).
62. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5101-5106 (1994 & Supp. 1997)).
63. See Mondale Hearings, supra note 60 (Letter of Transmittal).
64. See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act ("CAPTA7), Pub. L. No.
93-247, § 4, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a) & (b)
(1994 & Supp. 1997)).
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
67. See CAPTA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106, § 4(b)(3) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
Reference in this section is to Parts A and B of Title IV of the Social Security




complete and complicated federal-to-state reimbursement
system which funds state dependency systems today.
The key state response to child abuse became the
mandatory reporting, investigating, and record-keeping
system that is commonly known as the child protective
services system. While all states had some form of reporting
law in place before CAPTA, few met the more rigorous
CAPTA requirements before 1974. CAPTA, in effect,
maintained continuing attention on reporting laws,
confidentiality, and investigation. It established a minimum
state response, determining when exclusive parental
control could be questioned and temporarily interrupted,
and which children had a plausible right to protection.
B. First Option: Recreating Exclusive Parenting Through
Reunification and Adoption as Permanency Goals
CAPTA addressed the "front end" of the system,
bringing attention to troubled families and children and
investigating them. It soon became clear that permanency
planning was crucial as children were being placed in foster
care in increasing numbers. Following passage of CAPTA,
the number of children reported as abused and neglected
exploded, and state-based foster care systems were flooded
with children placed as a result of reporting and
investigation through child protective services. Senator
Cranston summarized the situation before the Senate in
1979:
The number of children in foster care in 1977 was approximately
500,000-nearly three times the number of children in foster care
as compared to 1961. In only one of every five cases does the
services plan for these foster children recommend a specific length
of placement. In other words, the so-called temporary provision of
foster care has no definite target date for ending the placement
and for placing the child in a permanent family setting. Over half
the children in foster care have been away from their families for
more than 2 years-about 100,000 children have spent more than
6 years of their lives in foster care. Nearly one-fourth of the
children have been in three or more foster family homes. Even in
cases where the agency had developed a plan for returning the
child to his or her home, in one-third of the cases, there was no
plan for visits between the child and the parent or another person
who would care for the child if returned home. There are more
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68than 100,000 children in foster care awaiting adoption.
As reports mounted thanks to CAPTA requirements, foster
care became the expedient and perhaps sole resource to
address the children's safety.69
Concerns that children were being unnecessarily placed
outside their homes and were languishing without
permanency in foster care led to passage of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA).7° Many
of the children were neglected, not abused. For such
children, it was hoped that temporary supportive services
would enable parents to resume their exclusive authority
and safely care for their children. The AACWA imposed the
mandate that states provide a plan to the federal
government requiring the state-based public agency to
make "reasonable efforts" to prevent placement in foster
care or achieve reunification for children temporarily
placed.7' The law also provided for adoption subsidies to
encourage the adoption of children out of foster care who
could not be reunified.72 States codified the reasonable
efforts and adoption language in their laws.7" If states failed
to meet the mandates of the law to plan for resumed or new
exclusive parenting relationships, they would risk losing
eligibility for matching federal reimbursement for their
foster care expenses.74
As a consequence of the fiscal incentives offered in
AACWA, family preservation efforts to reunify families
flourished, and the rate of increase of foster care placement
decreased and nearly leveled off between 1982 and 1986.7,
Unnecessary foster care placement and foster care drift
were addressed by requiring case planning, case reviews,
reunification efforts and subsidies for adoptions of children
leaving foster care.76 The law required that whenever the
68. 125 CONG. REc. 22,679 (1979) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
69. Id.
70. Pub. L. No. 96-272, 94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 602, 608, 620-28, & 670-76 (Supp. 1997)).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 671 (Supp. 1998).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
73. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366 (West 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. §
43-15-13 (1999).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a).
75. See CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FUND, THE STATE OF AmERICA'S CHILDREN
YEARBOOK 22 (1994).
76. Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272,
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determination to place a child in foster care was pending,
the court had to make a finding as to whether "reasonable
efforts" had been made to prevent the placement. The hope
was that this procedural requirement could reduce the
unnecessary placement of children in foster care when
services to their families could maintain them safely at
home.77
The provisions of the Social Security Act codifying the
AACWA have been revised over the past two decades to
require a myriad of planning processes in exchange for
federal reimbursement for foster care.78 The state is
required to have a written document for each child in care
which includes, in part,
a plan for assuring that the child receives safe and proper care and
that services are provided to the parents, child, and foster parents
in order to improve the conditions in the parents' home, facilitate
return of the child to his own safe home or the permanent
placement of the child.
9
The permanency aspects of case planning are further
codified to require states to document their activities:
In the case of a child with respect to whom the permanency plan is
adoption or placement in another permanent home, documentation
of the steps the agency is taking to find an adoptive family or other
permanent living arrangement for the child, to place the child with
an adoptive family, a fit and willing relative, a legal guardian, or
in another planned permanent living arrangement, and to finalize
the adoption or legal guardianship. At a minimum, such
documentation shall include child specific recruitment efforts such
as the use of State, regional, and national adoption
exchanges 80
Considering the reasonable efforts required in the
federal law which sets the framework of mandates for each
of the state child welfare systems, the overarching goal, at
least since 1980, has been reunification with the biological
94 Stat. 500 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 602, 608, 620-628, 670-
676 (1997)).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994 & Supp. 1998).




parents.8 If reunification is unworkable, an alternative
exclusive parenting arrangement is sought.
Following passage of the AACWA, criticism began to
mount over the perceived emphasis on reunification. While
the law had also provided for adoption subsidies to
encourage and support the adoption of children out of foster
care, the emphasis on reunification was criticized for
fostering a climate in which children were left in unsafe
homes and sometimes returned to unsafe homes.82 The
deaths of several children at the hands of their caretakers
when public child welfare agencies knew of the dangers
posed by the parents raised the urgency of reform efforts.83
C. Second Option: Independent Living as a Permanency
Goal
Revisions in planning requirements specifically
addressed the needs of older children in foster care in the
mid 1980s. In 1986, the Independent Living Initiative (ILI)
was passed.84 For children sixteen and over, the ILI requires
specific planning to help these older children before they
age out of the foster care system. These planning
requirements were expanded by the Foster Care
Independence Act in 1999" to include more types of services
for a longer period of time for children aging out of care.
The provisions of the ILI provide funding for states to assist
children who were currently or had in the past received
foster care maintenance payments or had been in foster
care. The goal of the ILI is "to help the individuals
participating... to prepare to live independently upon
leaving foster care." ' The programs suggested by the
federal legislation for states to provide to older foster
children included programs to "enable participants to seek
81. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 675 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (noting that
placement with a relative or in a legal guardianship is federally recognized but
is not federally subsidized). See infra Part IV, discussing and advocating
subsidization.
82. See generally NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CHILD ABUSE, FINAL
REPORT (1996).
83. See id.
84. Pub. L. No. 99-272, Title XII, § 12307(a), 100 Stat. 294 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 677 (2000)).
85. Pub. L. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822 (1999), amended by Pub. L. 106-169, §
101(b) (1999).
86. 42 U.S.C. § 677(d) (1991 & Supp. 1997).
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a high school diploma[,] ... vocational training[, ...
provide training in daily living skills[, and] ... provide each
participant a written transitional independent living plan
which shall be based on an assessment of his needs." '
The Foster Care Independence Act, discussed in Part
III, infra, attempts to improve independent living services.
The plight of older foster children was detailed in the
legislative hearings for the Foster Care Independence Act.
The recent legislation inadequately addressed the problems
revealed. More is needed to provide parental supports, not
just programmatic sessions, for children aging out of care
for whom no exclusive parenting relationship could be
arranged.
PART III: ENHANCING THE FIRST AND SECOND OPTIONS: THE
ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT AND THE FOSTER CARE
INDEPENDENCE ACT
"Those of us who have teenagers know that when the
child becomes 18, they still need the guidance, the support,
the direction of parents."8
In the 1990s, the number of children in foster care
began to increase once again. While the reasons for this are
complex, the increase is usually attributed to the crack
epidemic in the inner cities and the increasing percentage
of children living in desperately poor conditions with young,
unmarried mothers. 9 A series of highly publicized brutal
deaths of children who were "known to the public agency"
and provided with preventive services in their own homes
instead of being placed in foster care led yet again to an
outcry for reform of the system.9 °
87. 42 U.S.C. § 677(d) (1991 & Supp. 1997).
88. 145 CONG. REC., H4957-04, H4968 (daily ed. June 25, 1999) (statement
of Rep. Lofgren, debating Foster Care Independence Act of 1999 (H.R. 1802)
(106th Congress, 1st Session)).
89. See id.
90. See generally NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CHILD ABUSE, supra note
82. For a discussion of the perceived problems with the reasonable efforts
requirement leading to the enactment of the Adoption and Safe Families Act,
see Christine H. Kim, Putting Reason Back into the Reasonable Efforts
Requirement, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 287 (1999).
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A. Background to Legislative Reform
The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (ASFA)9"
was a partial response both to the outcry for swifter
removal from abusive homes and for expedited adoptions.
The new law provides exceptions to the reasonable efforts
requirement introduced in the AACWA when "aggravated
circumstances" are present.92 The section providing for the
exceptions appears uncontroversial at first glance, citing
torture, death of another child, or sexual abuse as
examples, but a more broad exception may come from the
"aggravated circumstances" catch-all provision which is left
to the states to define.93 The full operational effect of the
new law is yet unclear, but it is significant in signaling the
first mandated retreat from reunification efforts. '
In 1997, with the passage of ASFA, Congress altered
the federal mandates on states providing foster care
services to abused and neglected children.95 In 1999,
Congress again amended the law governing these
placements by focusing on the needs of older children in
out-of-home care and passing the Foster Care Independence
Act.96 These two laws represent a change in philosophy from
the previous law, moving from family reunification toward
alternative placements via adoption or independent living
arrangements. They also highlight the difficulty in
legislating to protect the needs of older children in care.
ASFA was passed to clarify that the health and safety
91. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat.
2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994 & Supp. 1998)).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D)(i) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
93. Id.
94. We do not yet know the full effect of allowing states to limit the cases in
which reunification services are provided. State laws were only recently
amended to clarify the new reasonable efforts requirements. See, e.g., 1999 N.Y.
LAws 107 (amending N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 358-a (McKinney 1992)). A broad
amendment by states to the requirement of providing reunification services
could further shift the balance in focus away from reunification and toward
removal, placement, and adoption for more children.
95. See Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 671 (1994 & Supp. 1997)). For a detailed analysis of some of the ASFA
changes and their impact in cases where issues of domestic violence are
present, see Sean D. Ronan, Comment, No Discretion, Heightened Tension: The
Tale of the Adoption and Safe Families Act in New York State, 48 BUFF. L. REV.
951 (2000).




of the child should always be paramount and to detail
circumstances under which reasonable efforts did not have
to be pursued. ASFA retreats from the goal of reunification
in certain cases where "aggravated circumstances" or felony
convictions exist. In a shift away from reunification and
toward adoption,97 the law also required that child welfare
agencies file petitions to terminate parental rights for
children in care for fifteen of the last twenty-two months.
In the earlier House version, the law expedited
termination proceedings only for children under the age of
ten.98 While the law ultimately passed did not include this
maximum age requirement, the sentiment of the Congress
throughout the debate was that the bill would impact
adoptions for this preteen population. The final law
includes additional important provisions for older children,
namely allowing states to designate them as "special needs"
children due to age and making them eligible for adoption
assistance in the form of health insurance.
Exclusive parent-child relationships through either
adoption or reunification, the first options in permanency
planning, were not always a viable option for children in
foster care. The Foster Care Independence Act was passed
to enhance services for children aging out of foster care with
the second option goal of "independent living." In a sense,
this law was necessary because of the failure of all previous
efforts to find and support families for children in foster
care.
B. Gap in Reform Legislation for Older Foster Children
The Adoption and Safe Families Act is not targeted to
assist older children in foster care. For many older children,
relationships with birth families are longer-lasting if not
stronger, adoptive families are harder to locate, and
permanency, through termination of parental rights and
97. For an article critical of this shift in emphasis, see Naomi R. Cahn,
Children's Interests in a Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption,
60 OHIO ST. L. J. 1189 (1999).
98. Adoption Promotion Act of 1997, H.R. 867, 105th Cong. § 3(a)(3)(E)
(1997).
99. Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, § 306, 111
Stat. 2115 (1997) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)); see 143 CONG. REc. 12,596
(1997) (statement of Sen. Chafee) (emphasizing importance of the medical care
adoption subsidy for teens adopted out of care).
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adoption, is not a viable alternative.' For those who
remain in foster care because their families cannot safely
care for them, the failure to successfully reunify or to
identify an adoptive family may mean that the children
leave foster care with no caretakers. For them, the goal of
"independent living" becomes the fall-back permanency
option. Faced with this, the public agency with custody of
the child in foster care attempts to prepare the aging-out
foster child with the skills and resources necessary to
succeed on their own. Instead of broadening the parent-
child-state triangle, it is collapsed into efforts to prepare the
youths for independent living with no parental and only
limited state assistance available.
Unfortunately, many young adults who age out of foster
care do not successfully make the transition to independent
living by the time they age out of care. Too many reappear
in shelters, jails or on the streets. The needs of aging-out
foster children were at least partially recognized by
Congress in passing the 1999 Foster Care Independence
Act. This law provides funding for services to assist youths
up to age twenty-one who are aging out of the foster care
system into independent living. Additionally, this law
provides reimbursement to the state for services for a few
more years, but does not provide a creative solution to
address the need for a parental figure.
In passing the law, Congress explicitly recognized that
the overhauls of the 1997 Adoption and Safe Families Act
were not sufficient in insuring permanent homes for all
foster children. In debate, Rep. Pryce remarked:
In 1997, Congress tried to help these children by passing
legislation to facilitate the adoption of children in foster care. As a
result, the dream of a permanent family and a loving home is
becoming a reality for more and more children. Yet despite our
best efforts to streamline the system and find willing families to
adopt these kids, the reality is that there are thousands of
children who will never leave the foster care system during their
100. States have standards for termination of parental rights which usually
include abandonment, permanent incapacity to parent and failure to remedy
the circumstances which placed a child into foster care. Federal law now
requires that petitions be filed if a child has been in placement for fifteen of the
past twenty-two months, but if contested, states will still need to meet their
statutory grounds for termination. The federal law includes exclusions from the
termination requirement. 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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childhood.10'
Rep. Camp expressed similar understandings when he
stated:
I was very proud to be a part of our efforts to revamp the Foster
Care system when this House passed the Adoption and Safe
Families Act two years ago. And our efforts are paying off-
preliminary numbers show that adoptions of foster children have
increased 40 percent since 1995.
But this bill takes the next step-it recognizes that no mater how
hard we work, some kids will turn 18 in foster care. They'll "age
out" of the foster care system without a network of family and
loved ones to turn to.
10 2
Despite widespread recognition of the need for "family
and loved ones to turn to,"'°' the Foster Care Independence
101. 145 CONG. REC. H4957-04, H4958 (1999) (statement of Rep. Pryce).
102. 145 CONG. REC. H4957-04, H4971 (1999) (statement of Rep. Camp).
103. Many members of Congress echoed this plea to address the need for
caring parent-like adults for older foster children. Rep. Pryce stated, "As
parents, we do not cut off our children once they turn eighteen, although I think
it is safe to say that even if we did, our children would have a better chance at
survival than the products of the foster care system." 145 CONG. IEC. H4958
(1999). Rep. Rangel remarked, "Most all of us know as parents that a child
becoming 18 does not necessarily mean that they are ready to assume the
responsibility of adulthood." 145 CONG. REC. H4960 (1999). Rep. Greenwood
added, "When we think of ourselves as parents, how many of us with our
children, who have the fortune to have had good, stable upbringings where they
are loved, how many of us say, here is your 18th birthday card, hit the street?
We do not do that." 145 CONG. EEC. at H4961 (1999). Rep. Cardin stated, "How
many of us as parents tell our children at 18 that they are on their own? We
have a responsibility." 145 CONG. REC. H4961 (1999). Rep. Foley remarked, "We
can all remember how hard growing up can be. Fortunately for most of us we
had loving and supportive of family and parents to nurture, encourage, and
teach us how to gradually enter adulthood. I could never imagine the feelings of
fear or uncertainty that a foster care [child] approaching his or her 18th
birthday must have." 145 CONG. REC. H4961 (1999). Rep. Eshoo said, "For those
of us with teenage children, we know that 18-year-olds aren't often prepared to
live on their own, paying their own bills." 145 CONG. REc. H4964 (1999).
For most young people in America, leaving one's home to be on your
own means voluntarily giving up the security of the family. You leave
when emotionally and economically ready for independence. The move
out coincides with a positive event, such as getting married or landing
that first big job. When setting up the first apartment, Mom has saved
silverware and dishes, Aunt Millie has that pull-out couch in the
basement, and Dad may put a fresh coat of paint on the walls. Most
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Act only provides for increased funds for enhanced
programming by the states and not for family supports for
children who need them.
Coupled with the Adoption and Safe Families Act, the
Foster Care Independence Act seems to provide an
increased but still inadequate spectrum of permanency
options for older foster children. First, they can be reunified
with their biological families. For these children, the
reunification takes place before they age out of foster care
so that they do not "age out of the system." Instead, they
leave the system to return home before they age out.
Another exclusive parenting option is adoption via state
termination of parental rights to free the child for adoption
and identification of an adoptive family. Again, these
children leave the foster care system with an exclusive
parent who replaces the state agency which had temporary
custody during the period of foster care. For those children
who are neither reunited nor adopted but instead age out of
the system with no identified caretaker, they are left to
independent living. If they live with or receive support of
some kind from relatives or other informal custodians,
there is no public assistance for such accommodation.'
C. Plight of Older Foster Children
Many children still exit foster care with no home, adult
assistance or real promise of a future. There are
approximately 500,000 children in out-of-home care on any
importantly, underneath it all is the security of knowing that if it
doesn't work out, you can always go back home. (And don't all the
parents of young adults in this room know that they often end up back
at our front door?)
Hearing on H.R. 671 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong.
(1999) (statement of William Pinto, Adolescent Services Coordinator,
Department of Children and Families).
104. Some localities use local money without state or federal
reimbursement, and some states use exclusively state money without federal
reimbursement to fund guardianships or other novel permanency plans. See,
e.g., Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized Guardianship,
Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 441, 456-74
(1996) (discussing state subsidies for guardianship); Kathleen 0. Byrne and
Matilda T. Bellucci, Subsidized Adoption: One County's Program, 61 CHILD
WELFAIE 173 (1982) (describing county subsidization for adoptions out of foster
care before adoption subsidies were available under the Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272).
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given day."°5 Nearly one-third of the children entering care
in any year or in care during that year are teens.' Of the
children leaving care, over 40% are teenagers. 7 Only 11%
of these are in care due to status offenses such as truancy
or ungovernability or delinquency. 8 The remainder are in
care mainly due to protective services, parental condition or
absence, or relinquishment of parental rights.' 9 Data is
available from the federal government from twenty-four
states on the outcomes for children of all ages exiting out-of-
home care. In the six months from April 1, 1996, through
September 30, 1996, 63% who left care were reunited with
their families and 11% were adopted."0 For 74% of children
exiting care, the first option of reconstituting exclusive
parenting was achieved.
In the findings accompanying the Foster Care
Independence Act, Congress estimated that 20,000 teens
leave foster care each year "because they have reached
eighteen years of age and are expected to support
themselves.""' Unable to arrange an exclusive parenting
permanency plan, the second option of independent living
remains the fall-back option. For these children, an
expectation of successful independence is uniquely
problematic.
Studies show that nearly 30 percent of these youths average nine
years in foster care without a permanent living arrangement. As a
result, within two years of leaving foster care, only half have
completed high school, fewer still are employed, and nearly 60
percent of the young women have given birth, almost always
outside of marriage.
Studies of children who have aged out of foster care are
105. STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 105th CONG., 1998 GREEN
Boomc BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 783 (Comm. Print 1998). Statistics in
the 1998 Green Book, the most recent available, are for 1995 and previously.
106. Id. at 786.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 790.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 796.
111. H.R. 3443, 106th Cong. (1999).
112. Gov't Press Releases by Fed. Gov't Doc. Clearing House, Inc., Nancy
Johnson, Foster Care Youth to Discuss Transition to Adulthood at Hearing
Tomorrow (May 12, 1999), available at 1999 WL 2224152.
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scarce,". but findings are consistently disturbing."' One
study of all forty-six young men discharged from an
independent living group home in New York City found
that the overall mean length of time these young adults had
spent in care before discharge was eight years."5 Three
studies relied upon by government sources report the tragic
next chapter for children exiting foster care.
As success in the current job market becomes even more
tightly connected to educational attainment, children aging
out of the foster care system are ill-equipped to compete.
The Westat study found that 46% of the 810 young adults
studied who had left foster care had not completed high
school."' That number was 37% for Courtney and Piliavin
113. For example,
[many foster youths have a difficult time making the transition from
the foster care system to self-sufficiency. While there are few available
studies tracking youths who have exited foster care, our review of these
studies reveals some consistent findings. Research has shown that
many former foster care youths have serious education deficiencies and
rely on public assistance .... In addition, former foster care youths
often find themselves lacking adequate housing.
Foster Care Independent Living: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Res.
of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. 18-19 (1999) (statement
of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Dir., Educ., Workforce, and Income Sec. Issues, Health,
Educ., and Human Servs. Div., U.S. General Accounting Office) [hereinafter
Testimony].
114. For a literature summary on the topic, see Richard P. Barth &
Marianne Berry, Implications of Research on the Welfare of Children Under
Permanency Planning, in 1 CHILD WELFARE RESEARCH REvIEw 323, 354-48
(Richard Barth et al. eds., 1994).
115. See Mallon, supra note 5, at 65.
116. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 18-19 (citing Richard P. Barth, On
Their Own: The Experiences of Youth After Foster Care, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT
Soc. WORK 419 (1990); Mark E. Courtney et al., Transitions from and Returns
to Out-of-Home Care, 71 SOCIAL SERVICE REV. 652, reprinted in MARK E.
COURTNEY & IRVING PILIAVIN, TRANSITIONS FROM AND RETURNS TO OuT-OF-HOME
CARE (1998). For an explanation on the findings of the Courtney study, see
Testimony, supra note 113, at 23-24 (statement of Mark E. Courtney, Assistant
Professor, School of Social Work and Institute for Research on Poverty,
University of Wisconsin-Madison); WESTAT, INC., A NATIONAL EVALUATION OF
TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE INDEPENDENT LIVING PROGRAMS FOR YOUTH: PHASE 2,
FINAL REPORT (1991)). But see id. at 22 (citing Maria Scannapieco, et al.,
Independent Living Programs: Do They Make a Difference?, 12 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT WORK J. 381 (1995)) (showing that foster children in existing care
who have received independent living programming during their stay in foster
care have better success than those who do not).
117. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 18-19 (citing WESTAT, INC., supra
note 116).
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who studied 113 former foster children and 38% for Barth
who studied fifty-five former foster care youths."8
Employment success was equally dire. Westat, the
largest study, found 51% unemployed 2.5 to four years after
leaving care."' Sixty-two percent had not maintained a job
for at least one year.2 ° Courtney and Piliavin found 39%
unemployed twelve to eighteen months after aging out of
the system. 2' Barth found 25% unemployed one to ten years
after leaving foster care."
Perhaps the two most disturbing correlations are
between aging out of foster care and homelessness.2 and
incarceration. Westat found that 25% of the former foster
children had been homeless at least one night.2 4 Courtney
and Piliavin found that 12% were homeless at least once
and that 27% of males and 10% of females had been
incarcerated at least once in the twelve to eighteen months
since exiting care.22 Barth recorded that 35% had been
homeless or moved frequently and that 35% had spent time
in jail or prison.126
118. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 19 (citing WESTAT, INC., supra note
116).
119. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 19 (citing COURTNEY & PILIAVIN,
TRANSITIONS FROM AND RETURNS TO OUT-OF-HOME CARE (1998); Richard P.
Barth, On Their Own: The Experiences of Youth After Foster Care, 7 CHILD &
ADOLESCENT SOC. WORK 419, 426 (1990)).
120. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 19 (citing WESTAT, INC., supra note
116).
121. See id.
122. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 19 (citing COURTNEY & PILIAVIN,
supra note 119).
123. The correlation between discharge from foster care and homelessness
has long been recognized. Mar Brita Maloney, Out of the Home Onto the Street:
Foster Children Discarded Into Independent Living, FORDHAM URB. L.J. 971,
988-89 (1985-86) (citing The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act and
Related Proposals: Hearings on H.R. 2810 Before the Subcomm. on Public
Assistance and Income Maintenance of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1985) (referring to testimony of Leonard Bradley, Deputy
Commissioner of Tennessee Dep't of Human Services on a Child Welfare
League of America state-by-state survey of state agencies asking what they
believed happened to children who age out of foster care)).
124. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 19 (citing WESTAT, INC., supra note
116).
125. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 19 (citing COURTNEY & PILIAVIN,
supra note 119).
126. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 19 (citing Richard P. Barth, On Their
Own: The Experiences of Youth After Foster Care, 7 CHILD & ADOLESCENT SOC.
WORK, No. 5, 424 (1990)).
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Invisible to these counts are the children who have no
stable home but live night-to-night on the generosity of
friends or acquaintances. Called "couch surfers" in child
welfare lingo, these teens are at risk for every frightening
possibility of the street.'27 "The couch surfing phase is
preliminary to being out in the street."2 ' The numbers for
teen pregnancy,'29 inadequate health care and other
indicators of maladjustment are similarly disturbing.
In introducing H.R. 3443 which later became the Foster
Care Independence Act of 1999, Congress emphasized its
concern for this vulnerable group of former foster children
and made the following findings:
(1) States are required to make reasonable efforts to find adoptive
families for all children, including older children, for whom
reunification with their biological family is not in the best
interests of the child. However, some older children will continue
to live in foster care. These children should be enrolled in an
Independent Living program designed and conducted by State and
local government to help prepare them for employment,
postsecondary education, and successful management of adult
responsibilities.
(2) Older children who continue to be in foster care as adolescents
may become eligible for Independent Living programs. These
Independent Living programs are not alternative to adoption for
these children. Enrollment in Independent Living programs can
occur concurrent with continued efforts to locate and achieve
127. See Susan K. Livio, Freedom Can Mean Problems for Ex-Foster Kids
Hitting Adulthood, HOME NEWS TRiB., Jan. 3, 1999, at A2 (Many former wards
of foster care would be homeless "were it not for the generosity of friends and
adults who have looked after him over the years. Social workers call such young
people 'couch surfers,' for their habit of sleeping on a friend's couch until they
wear out their welcome."); Susan K Livio, Death, Disappointment Stalk "Couch
Surfers," COURIER-NEWS (A Gannett newspaper serving Central New Jersey),
Nov. 14, 1998, at Al.
128. Statement made by Stephanie Schwartz of Crossroads, an outreach
program for troubled youth in Burlington County. Susan K. Livio, Abusive
Foster Care Left Teen Ill-Equipped for Freedom, COURIER-NEWS (Dec. 13, 1998)
available at http://www.injersey.com/news/story/0,1210,143770,00.html.
129. A 1991 study found that two to four years after leaving foster care,
nearly 66% of teens were mothers compared to twenty-five percent in the
general population. See BRONWYN MAYDEN, SEXUALITY EDUCATION FOR YOUTH IN
CARE: A STATE BY STATE SURvEY, at 5 (CWLA Press, 1996) (citing Sharon G.
Elstein, Teenagers Are Adoptable: Strategies for Success, 18 CHILD L. PRAc. 49(June 1999) (citing WEsTAT, INC., supra note 116).
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placement in adoptive families for older children in foster care.
(3) About 20,000 adolescents leave the Nation's foster care system
each year because they have reached 18 years of age and are
expected to support themselves.
(4) Congress has received extensive information that adolescents
leaving foster care have significant difficulty making a successful
transition to adulthood; this information shows that children aging
out of foster care show high rates of homelessness, non-marital
childbearing, poverty, and delinquent or criminal behavior; they
are also frequently the target of crime and physical assaults.
(5) The Nation's State and local governments, with financial
support from the Federal Government, should offer an extensive
program of education, training, employment, and financial support
for young adults leaving foster care, with participation in such
program beginning several years before high school graduation
and continuing, as needed, until the young adults emancipated
from foster care establish independence or reach 21 years of age.
13 0
The purpose of the law was to enable states and
localities to provide a spectrum of training programs to
better prepare children aging out of foster care. The bill
never included new or creative alternatives to create
families or supportive homes for these children. The
purpose was described as follows:
(A) PURPOSE-The purpose of this section is to provide States
with flexible funding that will enable programs to be designed and
conducted-
(1) to identify children who are likely to remain in foster care until
18 years of age and to help these children make the transition to
self-sufficiency by providing services such as assistance in
obtaining a high school diploma, career exploration, vocational
130. H.R. 3443, introduced November 18, 1999. S. 1327, 106th Cong. §
101(a)(3) (1999), has some additional information, which states:
In addition, approximately 5,000 adolescents (foster children over the
age of 12) are adopted out of the foster care system each year, of whom
approximately 620 are over the age of 16 at the time of their adoption.




training, job placement and retention, training in daily living
skills, training in budgeting and financial management skills,
substance abuse prevention, and preventive health activities
(including smoking avoidance, nutrition education, and pregnancy
prevention);
(2) to help children who are likely to remain in foster care until 18
years of age receive the education, training and services necessary
to obtain employment;
(3) to help children who are likely to remain in foster care until 18
years of age prepare for and enter postsecondary training and
education institutions;
(4) to provide personal and emotional support to children aging out
of foster care, through mentors and the promotion of interactions
with dedicated adults; and
(5) to provide financial, housing, counseling, employment,
education and other appropriate support and services to former
foster care recipients between 18 and 21 years of age to
complement their own efforts to achieve self-sufficiency and to
assure that program participants recognize and accept their
personal responsibility for preparing for and then making the
transition from adolescence to adulthood.'
3
'
Rep. Johnson, co-author and lead co-sponsor of the
legislation with Rep. Cardin, summarized the goal of the
legislation as "to prepare these young people to be able to
move into the work force or to continue with their education
on the very day they leave foster care. These children face
very difficult problems and we must create programs to
help them learn to be self-reliant."
32
131. H.R. 3443, 106th Cong. was passed by the House of Representatives on
November 18, 1999 and by the Senate on November 19, 1999 as the Foster Care
Independence Act of 1999. It was signed into law by President Clinton on
December 14, 1999. The earlier version debated on the floors of the House and
Senate, H.R. 1802, 106th Cong. (1999) contained substantially similar finding
and purpose sections. H.R. 1802 was passed by the House in June. Both H.R.
3443 and H.R. 1802 were titled, "The Foster Care Independence Act of 1999."
Finding (a)(2) was added in H.R. 3443.
132. 145 CONG. REC. H4957, H4960 (1999) (remarks of Rep. Johnson)
(discussing H.R. 1802). Like many of the speakers, a litany of bad outcomes for
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The intent of the Foster Care Independence Act was not
to create families or family supports but rather to create
programs to assist the teens into self reliance. Only up to
30% of any states funding under this legislation can be used
for room and board for children ages eighteen to twenty-
one. These funds are valuable in helping to subsidize the
former foster child's existence but not in seeking committed
adult supports for the youths.
PART IV: CREATING A NoN-ExCLUSIVE PARENTING THIRD
OPTION: OPEN ADOPTION, GUARDIANSHIP, MENTORSHIP
"In hindsight, I can say that if you want to prepare a
child for independent living, you do one thing. Teach him to
set up a support system." This statement was made by Amy
Clay, a nineteen-year-old foster youth and college student.
13
In hearings before Congress on the Foster Care
Independence Act, the story of Shauntee Miller, a young
mother in foster care, highlights the need for creative non-
exclusive parenting for teens, especially teenage mothers.
Ms. Miller lives in an independent living program
apartment and sees her daughter, also in foster care, on
weekends.' Is the foster parent of Ms. Miller's daughter a
possible guardian or mentor for the young mother? Without
such a parental figure, can Ms. Miller realistically reunify
safely and permanently with her daughter? If the young
mother's rights are ultimately terminated and her daughter
is adopted by the daughter's foster parents, could an open
adoption which allows for some ongoing contact between
Ms. Miller and her daughter be beneficially facilitated?
the foster children was detailed by the speaker, "Today, two-thirds do not
complete high school, 61 percent have no job experience, and 38 percent are
diagnosed emotionally disturbed. Most end up jobless, addicted, pregnant, or in
jail." Id.
133. Amy Clay, Assisting a Youth in Transition, 18 CHILD L. PRAC. 65
(1999).
134. Foster Care Independence Act, 1999: Hearing on S. 1327 Before the
Subcomm. on Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th
Cong. 23 (1999) (statement of Shauntee Miller, Student, Baltimore Studio of





I use the term open adoption under the broadest
definition, requiring neither a formal contract nor court
order but allowing for some ongoing contact to facilitate the
surrender of rights and the finalization of the adoption.13
5
Open adoption requires the termination of parental rights
but allows for some continued contact between the birth
family and the child. It could be as minimal as letters and
pictures or could involve ongoing visitation. Some
distinguish open adoption from cooperative adoption. 36 In
cooperative adoption the ongoing contacts are arranged by
mutual collaboration or agreement, a contract which is
made between the birth parent(s) and the adoptive parents.
The term open adoption is used more generically to refer to
any adoption in which confidentiality is comprised by
opening records, exchanging information, visiting, etc. In
this article, the purpose in suggesting open adoption is to
allow ongoing contact in whatever form will facilitate the
finalization of the adoption and thus some familial supports
for older children in foster care. The adoption may be open
by informal agreement, contract or court order. 37 Like
traditional closed adoptions, open adoptions should be
eligible for all forms of adoption assistance and subsidies.
States only began to enact adoption statutes in the
middle of the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century,
legislatures amended the laws by providing confidentiality
for the process, thereby creating the notion of closed
135. Carol Sanger uses such an inclusive working definition to describe both
direct and indirect contact between the child, birth parents, and adoptive
parents. She makes the point that open adoption "increases the number of
children available." Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 CoLUm. L. REV.
375, 492 (1996). Others have echoed the prospect, emphasized here for older
children, that open adoption may provide stabile familial relationships for some
children who would not otherwise have parents who could care for them. See
Lawrence W. Cook, Note, Open Adoption: Can Visitation with Natural Family
Members Be in the Child's Best Interest?, 30 J. FAM. L. 471, 477-78 (1992). But
see Carol Amadio & Stuart L. Deutsch, Open Adoption: Allowing Adopted
Children to 'Stay in Touch' with Blood Relatives, 22 J. FAM. L. 59, 60-61 (1983-
1984) (defining open adoption as an agreement in writing approved by the
court).
136. See, e.g., Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption:





adoptions. 8' While closed adoptions were the norm in the
1970's, some open adoptions were informally arranged and
legally sanctioned at that time.9 Only a few states
legislatively endorse open adoptions. "'
For all children in foster care with positive memories
and bonds to their birth families, open adoption may
provide a mechanism for permanency which does not
require a total severance of ties with that family. This is
especially relevant in cases of adoption by relatives where
confidentiality is impossible. " For older children aging out
of foster care, open adoption may provide a mechanism to
allow the contacts that both the child and birth parent
want, or allow for ongoing sibling contact. Allowing these
relationships to continue in some form may make the
termination of parental rights more tenable for both
parties. This could facilitate an adoption which could not
otherwise occur by assuring the parents that in
surrendering their rights and freeing their child for
adoption, they will not lose all contact with the child.
B. Guardianship
Guardianship is a judicially sanctioned arrangement-an
adult can act as a guardian for a child for the duration of
the court order. Guardianship was originally used to
oversee a minor's property or estate when his/her parents
were deceased or could not otherwise perform this function.
Probate guardianships, as they are sometimes called, do not
138. See id. at 1003-05.
139. See generally Annette Baran et al., Open Adoption, 21 Soc. WoRK 97,
97-100 (1976) (advocating that open adoption should be accepted as an
alternative and discussing an "experiment" in which an author arranged an
open adoption).
140. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.130(c) (Michie 1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. §
32A-5-35(A) (Michie 1995); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 383(c)(3)(b) (McKinney 1992);
TENN CODE ANN. § 36-1-121(f) (1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.33.295(1)
(West 1996). Other states have sanctioned open adoption through case law. See,
e.g., Adoption of Gwendolyn, 558 N.E.2d 10, 14 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990) (holding
that visitation post-adoption is permitted, but at discretion of adoptive parents);
Michaud v. Wawruck, 551 A.2d 738 (Conn. 1988) (ruling that contract between
birth and adoptive parents was not contrary to public policy).
141. See Appell, supra note 136, at 1011-12.
142. The importance of sibling bonds is rarely paramount in the child
welfare system. For a discussion of the importance of the bonds and their
implications for advocacy, see Sharon G. Elstein, Making Decisions About
Siblings in the Child Welfare System, 18 CHILD L. PRAC. 97 (1999).
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involve physical custody of the child but are the antecedent
to the current use of guardianships by the family or juvenile
courts. 4 1 Probate guardianships, like the guardianships
now ordered in the child welfare system, could be for a
defined period of time or ongoing. Guardianship
traditionally terminates no later than a child's eighteenth
birthday. Just as foster care can continue to age twenty-one
by continuation of the placement order, the court arranging
the guardianship could have jurisdiction to continue the
guardianship to age twenty-one or even beyond.
Today, guardianships are often provided by relative
caretakers who have been kinship foster care resources.
Guardianship provides for a more permanent status to the
arrangement.' Guardianship also allows for the discharge
of the child from the child welfare system in many
instances, ending supervision by the agency and the court
except for the negligible supervision that may be provided
by the court overseeing the guardianship. 45 It is usually a
single guardian or mother and father unit which is
identified to provide guardianship. This does not require
termination of parental rights and, in that sense, is non-
exclusive. Often relatives prefer guardianship to adoption
because they do not have to endure a legal battle to
terminate the parental rights of their sibling or other
relative. Biological parents may be willing to consent to a
guardianship by a sibling or other relative but not to
adoption which severs their parental rights. Biological
parents may participate in the selection of a guardian, 4 6
143. See, e.g., ROBERT D. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 767-77
(1999); Robert M. Gordon, Drifting Through Byzantium: The Promise and
Failure of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 83 MINN. L. REV. 637,
691 (1999); Bogart R. Leashore, Demystifying Legal Guardianship: An
Unexplored Option for Dependent Children, 23 J. FAM. L. 391 (1984-1985).
144. Section 101(b) of The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L.
No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)),
added a definition of legal guardianship to the law. While useful for clarification
and uniformity of rights to be conferred onto guardians, no subsidization of
guardianship is provided in federal law.
145. Professor Martha Fineman challenges us to separate state support
from state supervision of families. For creative permanency planning for
children who are over age eighteen, support and supervision must exist along a
continuum to meet the individual needs of children and the adults sharing the
parental responsibilities for them. See Fineman, What Place for Famly Privacy?,
supra note 9.
146. For terminally ill parents, stand-by guardianships or joint
guardianships are used to plan for the child's care when the parent is no longer
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and may enjoy ongoing visitation with the child. In families
where property is available, guardianship also allows the
child to inherit from the parent and does not release the
parent from financial support.
Guardianships are a form of non-exclusive parenting
and are frequently used but are not generally supported by
federal subsidy as are adoptions.'47 Guardianships are not
currently subsidized by the federal government except by
waiver.'8 An end to state intervention and supervision of a
well-functioning guardianship may be a permanency
triumph; a custodial relationship moves from foster care to
guardianship. Unfortunately, with the discharge from
foster care comes an end to the subsidy which had been
available to provide kinship foster care but is not available
for guardianship. This loss of funding may prohibit some
relatives from making the move to guardianship.
A demonstration project in Illinois providing for
subsidized guardianship predicts that 4000 children will
move out of kinship foster care and into more permanent
and stable subsidized guardianships under the program.
Other states allow for subsidization of guardians although
their state funds are not reimbursed by the federal
government.5 °
able to do so. See, e.g., Sunny Rosenfeld, Developments in Custody Options for
HIV-Positive Parents, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 194 (1996). It is common
practice for parents drafting a will to name guardians for their children. See,
e.g., Esther Appelberg, The Significance of Personal Guardianship for Children
in Casework, 49 CHILD WELFARE 6 (1970) (advocating that social workers and
caseworkers should encourage parents to draw up wills and name guardians for
their children even when there is little or no property to pass on to the
children).
147. The idea of subsidized guardianship has been circulated for years but
never adopted by the federal government. See, e.g., Leashore, supra note 143;
Marla Gottlieb Zwas, Kinship Foster Care: A Relatively Permanent Solution, 20
FORDHAm URB. L.J. 343 (1993). For a discussion of subsidized guardianship as
an exclusion from a declining subsidized reimbursement scale, see Gordon,
supra note 143, at 691-92.
148. See Meryl Schwartz, Reinventing Guardianship: Subsidized
Guardianship, Foster Care, and Child Welfare, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 441, 456-74 (1996); Kathleen 0. Byrne and Matilda T. Bellucci,
Subsidized Adoption: One County's Program, 61 CHILD WELFARE 173 (1982).
149. Adoption Promotion Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 867 Before the
Subcomm. on Human Res. of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th
Cong. 58 (1997) (statement of Jess McDonald, Director, Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services, Springfield, Illinois, on behalf of the American
Public Welfare Association).
150. See ALASKA STAT. § 13.26.062 (Michie 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-814
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C. Mentorship
The word "mentor" has a Greek origin meaning
steadfast and enduring. 5' In Homer's Odyssey, Odysseus
leaves behind his friend, Mentor, to be the guide and
educator of his son, Telemachus. Today, the term is used to
describe a variety of adult-child supportive relationships 2
in which the adults offer themselves as short or long term
role models for children and offer some guidance to the
child.'5' Mentoring programs have existed in the U.S. at
least since the turn of the century with the development of
the Big Brother Program in 1902.' They are increasingly
proposed and utilized.. as a preventive measure against
(1999); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11405 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-
421 (1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-45(B) (Michie 1974 & Replacement
Pamphlet 1999); W. VA. CODE § 49-2-17 (1998). California does allow AFDC-FC
payments to non-related guardians. See Timmons v. McMahon, 286 Cal. Rptr.
620 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
151. EBENEZER COBHAM BREWER ET AL., BREwER's DICTIONARY OF PHRASE
AND FABLE (16th ed. 2000), available at http://www.bibliomania.com/Reference/
PhraseandFable/data/829.html.
152. Mentoring in the one:one model may not be possible for all children.
Alternatives are being explored with less intensive interaction. For a study of
one such program in New York City, see Antronette K Yancey, Building
Positive Self-Image in Adolescents in Foster Care: The Use of Role Models in an
Interactive Group Approach, 33 ADOLESCENCE 253 (1998).
153. Evaluations of such programs are scarce. For a review of a variety of
programs, see Dionne J. Jones et al., Reaffirming Young African American
Males: Mentoring and Community Involvement by Fraternities and Other
Groups, 16 URB. LEAGUE REV. 9 (1993).
154. See David Royse, Mentoring High-Risk Minority Youth: Evaluation of
the Brothers Project, 33 ADOLESCENCE 145 (1998).
155. One positive example of a mentoring program is the NYC Independent
Living Partnership where youths and their adult mentors meet semiannually
for a weekend retreat and monthly for a support group informally as a network
of support. See Gerald P. Mallon, After Care, Then Where? Outcomes of an
Independent Living Program, 77 CHILD WELFARE 61 (1998). This model provides
a network not only of adult mentors but also of former foster children who can
support one another in the community. The PRIDE (Personal and Racial/Ethnic
Identity Development and Enhancement) program uses successful mentors
from the foster child's same cultural background to provide positive role models.
This is not a one-one program nor is it a one day seminar. Instead, the program
uses a series of group sessions to provide interaction between the foster child
and mentor. It is not an intensive form of mentoring, but its effects have been
positive. See Yancey supra note 152. But see David L. DuBois & Helen A.
Neville, Youth Mentoring: Investigation of Relationship Characteristics and
Perceived Benefits, 25 J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 227, 227-28 (1997) (defining
mentoring as a "one-to-one relationship between a [youth] and a caring adult
who assists the [youth] in meeting academic, social, career, or personal goals"
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juvenile crime,156 unemployment,' school dropout'58 and
teen pregnancy.
The term is used here to describe a supportive adult
and to distinguish the mentors from those with
guardianship or some other form of parental rights over the
child. For children who do not have adults in their lives
able or willing to enter into more formal parenting
relationships of guardianship or adoption, mentors provide
some adult supervision and support which could be
extremely necessary at difficult times such as the transition
out of foster care. The term usually refers to volunteer
adults.60 Youths receiving independent living services are
often served in an aggregate setting with little one-to-one
adult mentoring or care.' While group homes may attempt
to provide life skill development experiences, safety
concerns may require home operators to lock away supplies
such as laundry detergent or cooking utensils, making it
impossible for youths to practice these skills in a relaxed,
ongoing way. Given the limitations on obvious group
activities such as these, resources for mentor programs are
often scarce or non-existent despite the fact that "officials in
all locations saw some type of mentoring program as one
method to provide youths with a vocational role model and
opportunities to practice other independent living skills
they have learned."6 '
Volunteer opportunities should be encouraged, but a
more structured, federally subsidized form of mentoring
where one or a variety of adults is paid to provide work,
(quoting Sandra Murray Nettles, Community Contributions to School Outcomes
of African-American Students, 24 EDUC. & URB. SOC'Y 132, 139 (1991)
(alteration in original)
156. See Michelle Lea Cherne Anderson, The High Juvenile Crime Rate: A
Look at Mentoring as a Preventive Strategy, 30 CRIM. L. BuLL. 54 (1994).
157. See Patricia Rowe, Volunteer Mentors Empower Inner-City Youths, 19
CHILDREN TODAY 20 (1990) (describing an externship/mentoring program for
Washington, D.C. youth to receive job training and experience along with career
mentoring).
158. See Elaine A. Blechman, Mentors for High-Risk Minority Youth: From
Effective Communication to Bicultural Competence, 21 J. CLINICAL CHILD
PsYcHIATRY 160 (1992).
159. See Jean E. Rhodes et al., Natural Mentors: An Overlooked Resource in
the Social Networks of Young, African American Mothers, 20 AM. J. COmM.
PSYCHOL. 445 (1992).
160. See MARC FREEDMAN, THE KINDNESS OF STRANGERS xii (1993).
161. See Testimony, supra note 113, at 20-21.
162. See id. at 21.
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school or emotional support to a teen aging out of the foster
care system is necessary. Subsidized mentors could insure
that no child exits foster care without some committed
adult support.
Such mentors could be identified by the public child
welfare agency in the same way that foster parents are
identified-either by direct contract with the public agency or
through subcontracts with not-for-profit and new profit-
making entities which provide a variety of services to the
child welfare system. Adults interested in assisting
children but unable or unwilling to make the commitment
as foster or adoptive parents could still play a crucial role in
the life of a teen. Alternatively, the teens could identify
mentors who might be willing to assist them in their
transition to adulthood. Foster parents of siblings or of the
children of teenage foster children are examples.
Even for older foster children leaving care to exclusive
parenting relationships, open adoptions or guardianships,
mentors could provide valuable educational or employment
assistance. For children exiting care with no committed
adult caretaker, mentors could play a vital role in providing
some parental support in the difficult transition from care.
CONCLUSION
The realization that some children leave foster care
without caring adults available to assist them challenges
the very notion of permanency planning which, in some
circles, means that all children who cannot be returned to
their biological families are adoptable."M At least since 1986
with passage of the Independent Living Initiative, reality
has overtaken theory to provide that "independent living" is
a suitable goal for permanency planning. In other words,
the goal for many children aging out of foster care is
"independent living" because the child welfare system
163. The Guide Program for foster adolescents is operated by People Places
of Charlottesville, Virginia. Teens in the Guide Program live with a responsible,
trained adult for eighteen months before they age out of foster care. The adult
serves as a "mentor, a sounding board, and a safety net for the teen." Foster
Care Independence Act, 1999: Hearing on S.1327 Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement of Kelli Sutton Block, People Places of Charlottesville, Va.).
164. See, e.g., Katherine Miller et al., Overcoming Barriers to Permanency
Planning, 63 CHILD WELFARE 45 (1984).
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-concludes there is no family or permanent home for these
teens. The system formulates a permanency plan with that
realization in place, based on a right to empowerment
triggered solely by age. Permanency planning needs to
accommodate third options between exclusive parenting
and independent living.
This article examines permanency planning for older
children in foster care and looks for creative third options
for those children who leave care with no adult parental
figure. For many of these children, termination of parental
rights of their biological parents is legally impossible,
emotionally undesirable or both. For others, parental rights
have or could be terminated, but there is no adoptive home
identified for them. How can their transition out of foster
care and toward adulthood be structured with some adult
assistance and support? How can bonds with their siblings
be maintained and encouraged?
Caring, responsible adults are necessary to assist
children aging out of the foster care system. For children
who are not reunited with their families or adopted before
they reach the age of majority, it is vital to identify adults
who will fill some of the roles which would otherwise be
filled by able parents. The concept of non-exclusive
parenting is used here to accomplish arrangements for
children who maintain a positive bond with their families of
origin, parents, or siblings, but cannot live with them safely
and securely. It is also used to develop permanency plans
for children who do not maintain such a positive bond but
whose parents' rights cannot be legally terminated.
By arguing that children need responsible adults
supported by the state even after age eighteen, this article
posits that the right to protection so integral to the child
welfare system does not cease on a child's eighteenth
birthday. Empowerment is important, and teenage children
should certainly be participants in their own permanency
planning, but that does not require cessation of the exercise
of a right to protection. As child welfare support via the
Foster Care Independence Act can continue to age twenty-
one, so may the suggested recommendations continue past
age eighteen to at least twenty-one when the child is in
agreement and the adult support is approved by the child
welfare agency or court.
For some children, open adoption or funded
guardianship may help to constitute the parental support
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they need to successfully enter adulthood. Open adoption
could be helpful in cases in which termination cannot be
otherwise finalized but the parent is willing to allow
another person to act as the primary caretaker and would
voluntarily surrender rights if assured of access, however
limited, by the parties or court in the future. It could also be
an important alternative in cases in which the teen does not
desire to sever all ties with his/her biological family but
recognizes that they cannot be a custodial resource and has
another adult willing to fulfill that role.
More use of guardianships and funding commensurate
with adoption subsidies for guardianship relationships may
also help achieve permanency for older children in foster
care. Funded guardianships could be useful in allowing
kinship care to be subsidized outside of state custody or
adoption. Perhaps this would enhance the size of the
potential custodial pool for older children as some relatives
or concerned adults may not want to be involved with the
state foster care system or in terminating a relative's rights
but would be willing to take on the caretaking of a child.
For other children, guardians or adoptive parents, even
in an open adoption, cannot be identified or sanctioned.
These children still need adult support and the assistance
of the child welfare system in designing their exit from care
to accommodate and reward the support provided. A child
welfare system operating in a non-exclusive parenting
framework could develop a permanency plan with several
mentors, hopefully identified by the child, who share the
parenting responsibilities that no single person is willing or
able to provide. They are adults, preferably chosen by the
child, subsidized to assist older foster children in a myriad
of functional and emotional ways to successfully enter
adulthood from foster care.
Open adoption, guardianships and mentors are crucial
for children aging out of foster care. Such options may be
especially beneficial for those foster children who had
babies while in care or have siblings with different
caretakers. For them, cutting all ties with their birth or
foster families may not be their preference even if it is
legally feasible. Creative caretaking or third option
arrangements in the form of guardianship, open adoption,
or designated mentors are currently inadequately funded.
Subsidization of these arrangements is vital to close gaps in
permanency initiatives passed in recent years.
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If properly funded, open adoptions, guardianships and
mentorships which accommodate non-exclusive parenting
are potential and plausible arrangements for many children
for whom reunification or traditional, closed adoption are
undesirable or unattainable. If the law could recognize
parents as important but not exclusively so, the outcomes
for older children could be healthier and more permanent.
Instead of focusing on termination/adoption or independent
living, older children would benefit from a system that does
not disqualify any adults who wish to be a positive
presence, no matter how limitedly, in a child's life. Children
aging out of foster care are a group that could significantly
benefit from a shared custody relationship facilitated and
funded by the state.

